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Summary
With the growth of instability and inflation in the 1970s, the heart of the
economic system is exposed to strains, interruptions and overreactions that will
make it impossible to continue to live on the present basis. Business and govern-
ment policies aggravate cyclical instability. Economic power is increasingly con-
centrated, a trend assisted by conglomerate and multinational mergers. Prices are
raised even in recessions, a retreat from market mechanisms that brings manufacturing
closer to the regulated industries, in a variant of the transit syndrome. Fragmented
government operations and policies facilitate the shifting of control from the public
to the corporate sector. Government acceptance of responsibility for growth and welfare
— an impossible task — makes it look inept and profligate, so that it becomes a
focus for public anger. But the close connection between politics and economics pre-
vents adjustment and restructuring to make institutions workable; it rules out inte-
grated private and public planning of economic operations. The probability that the
mixed economy can provide an alternative solution through pragmatic developments is
hardly high enough to be believable.
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The Coming Death of the Mixed Economy
The mixed economy, that pcst-Keynesian sharing of responsibility
for economic progress by government and business, is constantly becoming
less viable. In the generation following World War II, it experienced
its best years. The government's commitment in the Employment Act of
1946 "to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power"
came at a time when wartime controls were being dismantled. The Act
facilitated the development of federal programs designed to expand or
support the economy while leaving the corporate sector free to accomplish
its share of the tasks involved in achieving mutually desired goals.
In the theory of the mixed economy, the corporate and the government
sectors were thus regarded as partners basically working for the
general good. The arrangement appeared to be satisfactory, and the
mixed economy came to its maturity in the long postwar prosperity.
It is the departure from this state of affairs that is the source
of concern here. With the growth of instability and inflation in
the 1970s, the heart of the system is exposed to strains, interrup-
tions, and overreactions that will make it impossible to live on the
established basis. Stagflation is symptomatic. Attempts to find
solutions in trade-offs and compromises are obsolete, and anything
new that might replace them is strongly resisted.
In speaking of the death of the mixed economy, it should be
understood that this in no way implies the death of the economy,
or even any major permanent collapse in economic activity. It does
mean that the present roles and relationships are untenable, that
the system needs restructuring to survive. In other words, there
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has to be a change in institutions, under which private and public
planning of economic operations will be integrated and results will
be controlled.
The probability that such a change can be accomplished through
piecemeal, pragmatic developments is hardly high enough to be believable.
The possibility cannot be entirely ruled out, but the changes actually
being worked for are diverse, back-stepping as well as forward-looking,
and are distorted by interferences with scientific evaluation. The
process of pragmatic selection, unplanned and controlled, is unlikely
to ensure the survival of constructive gains. So outcomes are more or
less accidental, the working out cf undiscriminatory forces in an
unstable, stagflationary situation.
Although the mixed economy is approaching its end, its demise
will not happen overnight. The concentration of economic power,
although it has progressed rapidly for a generation, is a slow process.
Similarly, the process of alienation, although speeded by the Vietnam
War and the following years of stagflation, needs further adverse
developments before it reaches a pressure point that is explosive.
On the other hand, such changes are not necessarily so distant that
this generation can ignore them.
The Two Cycles
Current attitudes and policies reflect an unwillingness to believe
that the economy is inherently and seriously unstable. Inflation is
regarded as "the number one economic problem" and is often thought to be
permanent. True, the inflation derives in part from long-term changes,
but even more it is an outgrowth cf the economic boom, which contains
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large cyclical components. Such booms—and inflations too—have
always ended in collapse and there is no reason to think results
will be different in the future.
The way to understand the present position is to think in terms
of two basic business cycles: the real cycle in production, investment,
real income and consumption, and in the stocks of goods and facilities
that are created by and used up in those processes; and the credit
cycle which builds or runs off stocks of money and money substitutes
by expansion and liquidation of debt. Both cycles are governed by
similar stock-flow relationships and the link between them is the
price system. The flows are amplified by the Keynesian multiplier,
and the stocks govern the turning points.
The interplay of these cycles carries the economy to extremes
that cannot be sustained: When one accelerates, it pulls the other
along, and when the other in turn speeds up, it puts new life into
the first. In the boom, as inflation is stimulated, there is in-
creased willingness to hold stocks and to incur debt for this purpose,
and high activity seems for a while to justify both, but only to the
point of downturn, when the excesses are revealed.
At the peak of the boom, redundancy in stocks of all kinds tends
to develop. This puts a damper on the advance and after the downturn,
the excesses have to be liquidated. The way to reduce surplus real
stocks is to cut back production and wait until consumption and dis-
investment bring them down; but since these stocks are mostly very
durable, it is a slow process, with unemployment remaining high
(witness unemployment of over cne-sixth of the labor force in 1939,
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after the 1929 peak had again been recovered) . The way to reduce
the surplus money stocks is, in the first instance, to buy other
assets, which drives up prices and depreciates money's value, and
later to pay off or write off debt, and since writing off is speedier,
it tends to dominate a major decline through spreading defaults
and bankruptcies (again look at the 1930s).
Currently, the economy is beginning a recession that may eventuate
in the depression of the 1980s. The expectation that business invest-
ment can hold up in the face of lower production and consumption is
without foundation. Business inventories will have to be cut back
with declining sales. Plant and equipment spending is also sensitive
to the need for capacity, and the idea that investment has been defi-
cient in recent years is mistaken. In real terms, business fixed
investment was above 10 percent of real CNP (gross national product)
in 1978-79. This is fully up to par for our economy, a full percentage
point above the average for the peacetime years, 1955-64, though low
for other countries. In manufacturing, investment has been adequate
to keep capacity moving up steadily, and with production failing to
grew, from the early 1979 high, it had already depressed the rate of
utilization to the point that new investment commitments must fall.
With the new setback, real fixed investment will join other declining
components.
In the credit cycle, the position is even more clear cut. Money
is created in credit transactions, mostly by the banking system on
the basis of fractional reserves. During the boom, the expansion of
credit has soared. In both 1978 and 1979, the total raised in US
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credit markets was nearly $500 billion, with four-fifths going to
nonfinancial sectors, and most of that to private borrowers. At this
$500 billion annual rate, the increase in debt was more than twice
the increase in GNP. It was three times the excess of private gross
investment over capital consumption allowances. As the country
floundered in the flood of credit, the volume of shaky debt that will
have to be liquidated was magnified.
The Role of Government
These cyclical developments pose an insuperable problem of stabi-
lization, solution of which is supposed to be the role of government.
Considering them as characteristic developments in an economy growing
with government help and thus ignoring their cyclical nature leads to
the dual fallacy of thinking that the government has the power to
control fluctuations and that the federal budget is responsible for
the inflation.
Actually, the combined impact of the cyclical components is over-
riding. The situation may be analyzed in terms of real components of
the gross national product—such as autos, housing, and business invest-
ment—or in monetary terms—such as money stock, credit, and private
debt expansion or liquidation—the total swings reach magnitudes far
beyond any potential adjustments in federal operations or budget that
might be designed to compensate for them. Yet in the theory of the mixed
economy the government is supposed to do so, and in the early 1960 ' s it
was argued that it had the capacity to do so. That argument has since lost
its relevance, and instead there are various proposals, such as a balanced
budget amendment, intended to reduce that capacity even further.
The complaints against the federal budget are not well founded.
Inflation has not been primarily the result of government spending or
deficits. Expenditures were pushed up in 1975 by the recession, but
they have been rising more slowly than GNP since. Direct claims on
resources through government purchases of goods and services have
risen only about half as fast. During the last two years, the impact
of the budget has been negative; from a large high employment deficit,
it has swung over to a substantial high employment surplus, for a total
deflationary swing of almost $50 billion.
Nor has government borrowing been the villain it is said to be.
There is no reason to think that government use of credit is more
inflationary than private use of credit, and except in 1975 and 1976,
the government has not taken more than a sixth of the funds raised in
US credit markets by nonfinancial borrowers. As inflation got worse,
the federal share of the increments of debt fell from 25.4 percent in
1976 to 13.4 percent in 1978 and to less than 10 percent in 1979.
Despite these restraints, the boom got out of hand. A major
complication grows out of the fact that government has become fair
game for anybody who can profit at its expense. The politics of
economics are mostly aimed at preventing the government from doing
things in the public interest in order to provide benefits for
specific groups. The pressures they create prevent the adoption of
restrictive measures during the boom and make stimulative measures
inefficient in the trough.
Tax policy is illustrative. Instead of letting the rise in
government revenues eliminate the deficits, as the theory of the
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automatic stabilizer would require, the politicians sought to gain
voter support by cutting taxes
—
particularly to favor the inflators
who were gaining the fastest increases in income. The results were
not what was hoped because the gains obtained as tax relief appear
as windfalls that add much less to real production than ordinary
income would and add more to the bidding up of existing assets. No
doubt the tax cuts actually made were supported by many good inten-
tions, but leaving funds with those who already have good incomes is
an inefficient means of achieving any real progress. Instead, one
of its main effects is to translate private into government deficits.
Waste of federal resources is not necessarily inherent in the
programs enacted; it often arises from private reactions similar to
the reactions to changes in the tax laws, when thousands upon thousands
of accountants, lawyers, and ethers quickly get busy figuring ways to
minimize the payments that must be made. In the case of the federal
commitment to full employment, a similar process of "adaption" has
occurred. This development may be seen as a culmination of the trend
toward absorption of government deficits into corporate surpluses. A
1975 study of this trend revealed the following developments:
1. The disparity in fiscal results as between government and
corporate accounts increased. Gross corporate savings rose with only
minor setbacks from $25 billion in 1953 to $120 billion in 1975. Over
the same period, the federal surplus or deficit held fairly steady near
V Lewis Bassie, "Fiscal Policy Without Controls" and "Cyclical
Effects of Deficit Spending," Illinois Business Review , December 1975
and February 1976.
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the zero line through 1969 and then plunged, to a deficit of $75
billion in 1975. The difference in results rose to an annual rate
of about $170 billion.
2. The corporate advantage was mostly concentrated in recessions.
In the 1954 recession there was hardly any difference; both accounts
showed minor dips and recoveries. In both the 1958 and 1961 recessions,
there were divergences in favor of gross corporate saving of about $10
billion. In 1970, this difference in results grew to more than $40
billion, and in 1975, to over $100 billion. The sum of these recession
differences accounted for practically all of the $170 billion total over
the entire period.
3. Differences in timing were also significant. In the first
three recessions both accounts tended to move up and down together. In
1970 and 1975 gross corporate saving began to recover as soon as federal
deficit increased and in 1975 ended the recession more than $10 billion
higher than at the start. Thus, the process by which the deficits are
absorbed into corporate surpluses has been greatly speeded.
Part of the trend in favor of the corporate sector had government
assistance, through tax cuts and investment allowances, as did the
support for other private savers. Even more, it derived from the price
system, which acts as a transfer system to benefit those whose power
tc raise prices is unrestrained. No matter to whom the federal outlays
are first paid, they go into spending and thus into the receipts and
surpluses of the sellers. No significant amount, it may be inferred,
is retained as savings by the unemployed or welfare recipients.
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In boom times executives want government to "do its own job and
leave them alone," but in bad times they want to be bailed out.
Secretary of the Treasury, William Simon, reacted against the practices
he observed as follows:
When they are enjoying prosperous business, they
rail against big government and growing bureaucracy;
they talk of the need for more of the free enterprise
that has provided this country the greatest standard
of living in the world. That's fine. But when the
business cycle turns down and their companies are hit
in one way or another, then these same executives
parade down to Washington to try to nationalize
their losses. They want to keep their profits, but
2
they want to nationalize their losses.
Politics and Economics
The present situation has grown out of trends over long periods
in which changes were constantly taking place. Among these, the in-
creasingly close connection between politics and economics is of
critical importance. Producers constantly try to advance their special
interests through government processes. Washington is loaded with
lobbyists seeking advantages for the organizations they represent.
As one businessman described the situation, "Cur life is closely inter-
woven with politics
. . .
Democracy is a rough game and we have to learn
how to play it. Playing it is not confined to corporations. The
labor unions have their own strategy and tactics for influencing policy.
2
Chicago Tribune
,
February 12, 1976, p. 1.
3Quoted in L. Silk and D. Vogel, Ethics and Profits: The Crisis
of Confidence in American Business, Simon and Schuster, p. 158.
-10-
The AMA works diligently to maintain gains of the medical profession.
The American Farmers Movement demands 100 percent of parity at both
taxpayer and consumer expense. Eowever, the greatest resources and
influence are at the command of the corporate sector.
The impact of lobbying is on the Congress and the politicans
directing the administrative agencies. It is effective there, in
blocking undesired legislation or getting other measures passed and
in swaying regulators to favor the regulated at public expense.
Still, there are limitations, because the politicians are supposed
to represent the people, and the people are not convinced that the
organizations doing the lobbying and the responses of government are
giving them what they want. On the contrary, the pollsters have shown
that over 80 percent of the people mistrust big business as well as
government and consider better regulation necessary to the public
interest. A retaliatory aspect of this popular view appears in legal
cases that have gained inordinate jury awards from big corporations
for damage or injury.
Big business tries to change these attitudes through public rela-
tions campaigns designed to redress "public ignorance." In taking
its case to the people, the oil industry alone is spending some $100
million a year for advertisements, publications, program grants, and
other means of influencing public opinion. This outpouring through TV
and other media is designed to improve the industry image, telling the
people about the good the corporations do and enlisting their support
on particular issues. Other industries and their spokesmen have been
playing the same game but no other on so large a scale. Although this
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bombardment of public relations propoganda has some effects, the
people have made judgments in their own way and have not greatly
changed their opinions.
In Congress, the combined lobbying, political action, and public
relations efforts are more effective, since these techniques are
closely related to those by which the members were elected. Their
effectiveness is demonstrated session by session, whether the subject
is tax reform, energy policy, enforcing competition, or extending
consumer protection. On the basis of extensive observation, Charles
E. Lindblom, Professor of Political Science and Economics at Yale
University concludes that big business has an effective "veto power"
over major political decisions.
In the long prosperity following World War II, the nature and
concentration of the corporate sector has changed as it has become
conglomerate and multinational. The magnitude and control of resources
hxs soared through unprecedented opportunities for accumulation;
procedures and policies have changed with steady downgrading of the
influence of market forces; and the financial community, also multi-
national, has served as a selective integrating force. Concentration
cf wealth has its counterpart in the concentration of political power.
With this, in the course of time, efforts originally ained at making
views known have merged into efforts to dominate government policy.
Still the domination sought has limits; the corporate sector does not
Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems
,
NY, Basic Books, 1978.
-12-
want full authority, it dees not want social responsibility, it wants
power to rule out interferences with its own operations and entitlements.
Some legislation not desired by business does of course get through.
The need to allocate the costs of social disutilities directly to the
producers responsible for them has resulted in the environmental protec-
tion, health and safety controls that have been established. These are
disliked not onl}' because they are restrictive but because they add to
costs and inflation. Complaints eagerly call attention to any bad
decisions on the part of the regulators and charge them with extremes
in applying regulatory standards. So a conflict situation develops:
the bureaucrats must be put in their place, whatever the facts of their
performance.
The idea that there is needless and useless staffing leads into
the idea that government spending is too high and then it is just another
step into the "campaign to cut big government down to size." Sometimes
this is just a diversionary tactic but basically, it is an attempt to
create pressures for the shifting of power from the government sector
to the special interests who are promoting the campaign. The transfer
of power obviously cannot be to individuals, to people who have little
voice or choice, but to the corporate sector. At the extreme it becomes
an attack on the mixed economy, a breaking of relationships that could
lead to no constructive outcome.
The drive to bend the government to the will of the corporate
sector derives from the nature of the corporation, from its basic
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goal of maximizing the value of assets controlled. (Note controlled,
not necessarily owned.) Increasingly, it brings the productive wealth
of the world into its domain, and at the same time it tries to conceal
this fundamental concentration of control over economic life by presenting
itself as just like any other individual. Its image building emphasizes
this in such slogans as "men serving man" and "people producing for people."
True, corporation executives, like other people, are mostly congenial
seekers of the good life, but the essence of the corporation is not
any mere collection of individuals. There is little the enlightened
executive can do to change the system. Most do not try. The group
dynamics of the management fratenity train him, reward him, discipline
him, and replace him as necessar}^ Success and conformity become
synonymous. What counts is the organization itself, the going concern
that must be kept going, the organization that will live forever, ac-
cumulating in accordance with the patterns of thinking that will make
it a "progressive" entity.
Unrestrained Pricing
The discretionary power to raise prices is an element in the
inflation. It is a trend factor, or perhaps better said a continuing
institutional change, making steady contributions year by year. So
far has the control of prices by industry been solidified that it is
no longer a question of whether prices will be controlled but only by
whom and for whose benefit they will be controlled.
V Lewis Bassie, "The Goal of Business," Illinois Business Review
,
October, 1968, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of
Illinois, Urbana, p. 2.
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The use of corporate power ains at protecting the prerogatives
tc which business feels entitled. In this period of stagflation,
the primary entitlement it is protecting, the one most subject to
controversy, is the freedom to set prices at desired levels. Poli-
ticians generally bow to this idea, accepting it in confusion with
personal liberty as part of the "American Way," though they may call
for voluntary cooperation and resort to other jawboning activities
when they feel inflation is putting their in a bad light with the
electorate. They do not know, or at least are unwilling publicly
to recognize, how widespread is noncompetitive pricing.
Monopolistic pricing has a long history. In this country,
abuses recognized almost a century ago led to passage cf antitrust
laws at the turn of the century. These were watered down by the
courts applying the so-called "rule of reason." This led by 1920
to still currently accepted principle of permitting free use of
corporate power provided it was exercised with proper discretion
—
a judgmental conclusion always to be decided by the courts. Contro-
versy again heated up in the Great Depression, when withholding
production to keep prices high was aggravating unemployment. In-
creasing industrial concentration was at the heart of the issue.
The facts of concentration and its significance for behavior
and public policy are spelled out in John Blair's book, Economic
Concentration . In introducing his discussion of the administered-
price controversy, Blair states, "... the systematic analysis of
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972, 742 pp.
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the relationship of industry/ structure to price behavior dates from
the work of Gardiner C. Means in 1935 ..." In recent years it
has been fashionable to avoid the term price administration; this
avoids controversy because the tie to concentration and market power
is usually ignored.
In the 1930s the well-organized oligopolistic industries were
relatively few, and at the depression low, the mechanisms of price
administration were in trouble even in those, but only as a temporary
condition. Since then the practice of setting prices with little
regard to the demand side of the market and adjusting production to
make them stick has come to dominate the whole economy. In the 1970s,
the oil companies and OPEC set a firm pattern by which public acceptance
will be assured—create temporary shortages, make allocations, or just
let shortages develop without planning remedies.
The changes in corporate structure and control and the displace-
ment of market forces have not gone unnoticed by other scholars in-
terested in the real world and particularly in the relationships
between the private and government sectors. They appear, for example,
in the works of John Kenneth Galbraith. His early work on counter-
vailing power was in effect a justification of the mixed economy,
in which the growing powers of any group would be matched and offset
by others. Later, he saw the bureaucratic control group which he
called the techncstructure of the corporation taking command, and
Op. cit.
,
p. 419. Keynes, writing his General Theory in those
depression years, also stressed the importance of price and cost in-
flexibility.
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now he sees a clear need for external restraints en prices and wages
because competition is no longer effective. These modifications of
his views by stages took place in adaption to the changing structure
of the economy rather than as revisions of knowledge about a stable
entity.
The control of prices under oligopoly depends on concerted action
by several powerful corporations that not only set the prices but en-
force them on the rest of the industry. For this few, the technique
of control is variously described as conscious parallelism or tacit
collusion; each knows in general how the others will respond and moves
to keep in line. Price leadership is one of the most common ways this
process works. The dominant concerns as a group confirm the initiative
of the leader, within the usual pattern of irinor differences. Thus,
without any break of legality that would be provable in court, the
whole industry arrives at a new monopolistic price schedule.
Enforcement also is tacit. It may not be fully effective but
the position of any competitor can be attacked in various ways if
the need arises. The small firms, although a large majority in num-
ber, handle only a small proportion of the business, and their profit
maximizing behavior may permit small differentials, but if price
cutting by any should threaten a large transfer of market share, the
rest of the industry will react to prevent it, usually making the
maverick unprofitable.
Concerted action and control require, of course, constant exchange
of information. This may be accomplished in various ways—on golf
courses, in clubs, at meetings of professional groups, and it also has
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been established in what the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting,
and Management called the network of interlocking directorships (April,
1978). The AFL-CIO points out that "Among the 130 top corporations
o
there was a total of 530 direct and 12,193 indirect interlocks."
Direct interlocks among ccmpetitors are illegal, but 8 top oil companies
show 44 indirect interlocks, where their directors meet as directors
of a third corporation. The intercommunication of knowledge about what
other big operators think and will do is not compatible with the main-
tenance of competition as demanded by free market theory.
The conglomerate merger movement has been influential in powering
the monopolistic trend. These huge multi-industry holding companies
are in a basic sense nonfunctional, since there are few management
skills that apply everywhere. However, they do extend price administra-
tion and tax avoidance into new fields. Control of subsidiaries is
decentralized, but the conglomerate insists that each should use
business-like methods and produce satisfactory returns for the parent
corporation. This usually means that prices must be administered pro-
perly and competition confined to the struggle for market shares.
"Wasteful" cost increases are tolerable if they can be loaded into the
prices charged. On the enforcement side, price cutting by competitors
is discouraged because the resources of the whole conglomerate can be
used to support the subsidiary if a price war should develop.
Q
' Markley Roberts, "The Interlock of Corporate Power," AFL-CIO
American Federationist
,
August 1978, p. 6.
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In the late stages of a great prosperity, many firms do not want
to expand, and the cash flow they are realizing is beyond their require-
ments. Then conglomerate mergers and some multinational mergers develop
logically from a corollary of the basic business goal: Control of assets
can be expanded more rapidly by using excess cash flows to buy up exist-
ing companies than by undertaking uncertain and expensive expansion of
enterprises already controlled. The resulting acceleration of the merger
movement depresses real investment and slows the growth of the economy.
On occasion the price situation does get out of hand, so appeals
are made for government assistance. The steel industry, for example,
seems to prefer stagnation with high prices and low investment to meeting
competition from abroad and calls for protection against imports. Labor,
fearing loss of jobs, adds to the pressure. The world-wide economic
growth that was aided for a quarter century by the pricing of inter-
national trade and investment is now being threatened by the revival
of protectionism, not just in the US but all around the globe.
At home, there are many obstacles to entry in any industry
dominated by giants. Full competitive opportunity comes only from
access to capital, both real and financial; from control of markets,
through sales organizations and advertising; and from the know-how
of specialists supported by laboratory or other analytical equipment.
The corporations that can handle all costs, many of which require
heavy outlays of a character that is fixed, or at least largely
detached from output, typically feel they cannot justify the various
investments needed unless prices are not allowed to deteriorate. In
practice, this means most of the changes must be upward.
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Administered pricing in industry typically involves the addition
of a desired percentage nark-up to average total costs at standard
volume, including per-unit depreciation and other fixed or seni-fixed
costs. Standard volume is a volume of sales expected to be realized
year-by-year, averaging good with bad, over a sequence of tine periods
for which capacity is or is to be provided; it is a profitably high
volume but still well within the limits of that capacity.
Inflation provides everyone who has the power to set prices with
a release from restraints, a rationale to explain why customers must
pay more. Costs are up, so prices should go up correspondingly. The
upsurge in costs can then be made the basis for rising profits. Seme
effects of current pricing methods under these conditions were spelled
out by informed observers of the business scene. Cne says, "businessmen
have learned to survive and even thrive in the current inflationary
environment." Two others agree that "Companies are passing on rises
in materials and labor costs with alacrity and . . . profits will prove
less vulnerable in the economic slowdown when it materializes." Thomas
A. Murphy, Chairman of Ceneral Motors, adds that more frequent price
9boosts "enable us to make more adaptions to the realities as they unfold."
For the economy as a whole, wages and salaries are the largest
element of cost, and it has become customary to talk of wages as giving
a cost-push to prices, and also of inflation as being a wage-price
spiral. In actuality, wages are seldom the initiators of inflation or
the prime determinants cf how high prices will go. The unions do
9
"The U.S. Structures Itself to Live with Inflation," Business
Week ," Jan. 29, 1979.
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bargain for favorable wage increases, of course, but their ability to
gain desired boosts depends on the ability of management to raise prices
enough to cover the increases. In this respect, labor and management
are not necessarily competitors, as often depicted, but collaborators,
because the increases are usually passed on, with profits correspondingly
enlarged.
Given this economic accommodation between labor and management
where unions are well established, one might think they have become
teammates for gaining at the expense of the rest of the community.
However, both wish to retain a respectable public image, and there are
two reasons why their cooperation is far from complete. First, labor
does not accept political domination by management; it backs candidates
not to management liking and advocates programs of health, safety,
welfare, environmental protection, consumer representation, and taxation
that are costly and troublesome to management. Second, it is another
corollary of the basic goal of business that accumulated capital should
be used to the maximum, so there is a constant effort to displace
labor with equipment in the drive toward more efficient methods of
production. In other words, automation is not merely an outgrowth of
technology but is part of the nature of capitalism. Thus, jobs are
eliminated and the relative position of labor is weakened. In fact,
labor has been unable to keep up with inflation in the 1970s and
average real hourly earnings have fallen. The dominant role in infla-
tion is that of the price setters, not the labor negotiators.
What is of greatest concern is that prices are now put up even in
recessions. In the 1970s price administration proved fully adequate,
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and the old economic theory which held that a downward shift in demand
would lead to lower prices proved fallacious. Hence, declining priceo
nc lor.^ar cushion a real decline; instead, rising prices as demand falls
mean that real activity is cut still faster. True, some of the increases
in 1973-75 were exogenous, especially in fuel and food, but the exogenous
factors are net a complete explanation. The more general prevailing
practice is what counts most.
The averaging of fixed costs on smaller volume tends to give prices
an extra push in declines. It may be pointed cut that prices are set on
standard volume, not actual volume, so that this problem should be by-
passed. However, producers under pressure do not operate on fixed
principle and make adjustments considered desirable. Even if some do
adhere to the principle, the averaging up of costs takes place in the
process of deciding what constitutes standard volume, since ideas of
what the market will take on the average tend to change as actual sales
decline. Then, the very increases in prices reduce sales volume, against
which the need for capacity is measured. So the downward revision of
standard volume tends to be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy.
To appreciate why this is of such great concern it is necessary
to understand the transit syndrome. The transit syndrome is a disease
of the local transit system, often fatal, that begins with a decline
in demand as passengers shift to private autos. Since prices are con-
trolled, attempts are made to sustain revenues by raising fares, and
also to reduce costs by cutting services, thus idling equipment and
workers. Higher fares and pecrer service drive away more riders,
further reducing revenues. Fares are still further increased, and
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since capacity is excessive, investment dries up and equipment is
undermaintained. The accumulation of downward tendencies creates
losses despite inordinately high fares, and unless subsidies are
provided, the enterprise fails.
In the broader economy, recession now tends to initiate a kind
of generalization of the transit syndrome. It hits with varying impact
on individual firms; the stronger firms in an industry may still profit
while the weaker may be squeezed out as volume drops. In any case,
with prices controlled and output restricted, the overall decline is
reinforced. The basic stock-flow relationship of the real cycle
reacts on investment at the start of the downturn and is reinforced
as the price increases cut real demand and the reduction in volume
boosts unemployment. The decline cumulates, and as the economy drops,
the special contribution of unrestrained pricing reverses the old
inverse relationship between price changes and unemployment. Instead
of displaying a trade-off, the two move together. The result is a
condition worse than stagflation, since it brings a situation in which
a smaller economic pie is divided more unequally, in favor of the in—
flators. Failure of government to intervene is unthinkable, but the
kind of government intervention we have known as part of the mixed
economy does not solve the problem, it merely provides a series of
stop-gaps.
The great institutional change in pricing from competition to
administration cannot be corrected by pursuit of the existing powers
and polices of government. It requires another institutional change,
a compensating change in the body politic that may be equally far
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reaching. Presumably one accomplishment of this change would put some
limits on price raising. The typical cry of the "free market" advocates
is that industry cannot survive without a profit. This is diversionary
propoganda. Nobody contends that there should be no profit. The issue
is quantitative, how large the profit should be. What it reduces to is
whether a group of autonomous corporation executives has a right to set
standards fo their own take and make enforcing decisions for pricing
based on these standards without regard to how adversely the public's
interest may be affected.
The corporation will survive. It has to be made to survive, because
these productive enterprises are essential to the operation of the economy
as a whole. What is not necessary is that they be responsible only to
themselves, with their own interests and policies dominating the community
as a whole.
The Propensity to Speculate
Another development that has been important in the inflation of
the 1970s is the growth in the propensity to speculate with borrowed
funds. This has spread from the financial community to the population
at large, whose awareness of profit opportunities in speculative
ventures is increasingly acute.
The great wave of stock market speculation on small margins in
the 1920s did not penetrate much into the real economy and was killed
in the collapse of 1929. Opportunities for any kind of resumption were
limited in the 1930s and 1940s. However, awareness of potential oppor-
tunities grew in the long prosperity that followed World War II and came
to infect much of personal spending and investing in the 1970s. The
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period of disturbance, alienation, and uncertainty consequent on the
Vietnam War opened the door to unlimited opportunities for profiting
at other people's expense—and to a general feeling that such profiting
was justified. The movement could hardly have reached the extreme
experienced in the late 1970s without ample funding to feed the fires;
it did receive such funding through government policies and the in-
genuity of the financial community in utilizing resources to maximum
advantage. What few understood was that the great credit boom which
resulted was primarily cyclical in character.
On the personal side there was a veritable anti-thrift revolution.
The philosphy of spend now, pay later, let the future take care of
itself prevailed. Credit in many forms was made available to promote
it, and terms were eased so that many auto contracts now extend over
a 5-year term. Mortgages were used not just for homes but for many
other things, including such "essentials" as vacation trips. In
1978 and 1979, the household sector drew upon credit for over $150
billion a year, almost 10 percent of personal income, and this became
creator, via the multiplier, of an even larger proportion of that
income.
The individual cannot be greatly blamed for trying to improve his
situation through borrowing, but two difficulties are inherent in it:
First, the fever displayed in this as in lotteries, casinos, and stocks
of gambling corporations is itself a factor in instability, and second,
a mass movement toward debt creation that opens the way for a mass move-
ment toward debt liquidation is not good for the economy. The speculator
is not interested in what is good or bad for the economy; he is not
trying to build for the long future, merely to cash in quickly.
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For its part, the financial community has participated in and
encouraged the speculative boom. The drive for maximum lending and
highest interest rates produces advertising to both attract savings
and stimulate buying. "Buy now and save" is a standard merchandising
motto. In housing, the exhortation becomes strident: "Sacrifice
anything to get a toehold in the housing market!" A group of financial
institutions advertises, "Want to pay $40,000 for a $35,000 house?
Wait until next year!" The policy of "borrow to buy now because
loans can be repaid later in cheaper dollars" is supported by easy
credit. As one observer put it, "Credit has not only been made easy
to get, it has been made hard to turn down." Only at the end of the
upswing, after debt is over heavy, do lenders become cautious about
bringing new applicants into the debtors' fold.
Tax provisions that in effect subsidize borrowing also encourage
forward buying. The assumption cf a heavy interest burden could be
justified on the basis that the government would be paying a large
part of it through income tax deductions. In fact, combining this
with inflation made it possible to argue that there was hardly any
burden or risk at all.
The mass media also contributes with ample publicity for offerings
or enticements. The "facts" quickly go out to people via "news" that
is printed, vocalized and pictorialized. Through all this consumers
have been made sophisticated abut borrowing but not equally so about
repaying. Many become overextended in multiple contracts. Some may
then use credit to pay creditors. Others, cynical in default, are
going bankrupt.
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For speculation by the owners of wealth, new games are continually
being devised. In the stock market, options trading affords a way
around margin requirements; it has opened the range of issues on puts
and calls and has soared in volume. Additions to and expansion of
commodities futures has also continually set new records. Anyone can
gamble in coins, art works, postage stamps, and horses. Financial
futures, too, give new opportunities for trading—in interest rates,
in exchange rates for major foreign currencies, and (it is proposed)
in the movements of stock market index numbers. Only small margins
are needed for futures trading. In addition, many kinds of tax
shelters and get-rich-quick schemes, sometimes fraudulent, help to
absorb some of the huge sums of loose money looking for magnifica-
tion.
In banking and savings institutions, the changes have come fast,
one on another, all through the 1970s, with the aid of the regulatory
agencies. Interest payments and lower reserve requirements on time
deposits led to constant shifting from demand deposits, and this en-
abled faster expansion of the total. The changes were helped along
in various ways, with new instruments, new techniques of lending, and
new secondary market operations. Standby credit and automatic savings
transfers to cover overdrafts have also permitted larger transfers of
funds to time deposit accounts. The regulatory agencies—not just
the Fed but the comptroller and the deposit insurers—have been serving
the special interests of the financial institutions under their juris-
diction, changing the rules to give each group what it wanted. The
intention was to keep the institutions profitably healthy and free of
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competitive disadvantages. Whether this was good for the economy, or
for them in the long run, was beyond the immediate concern.
Through these changes the door was opened to an array of new forms
of money, accelerating the expansion of the total stock. Checks or
similar orders can now be written against various kinds of savings and
time deposits, including credit unions and even money market mutual
funds. Today credit cards may be more acceptable than cash; standby
credit and automatic transfers prevent overdrafts; repurchase agree-
ments give fast access to cash, as do certificates also, though with
seme penalties. Overnight Eurodollars are placed well up in the Fed's
redefinition of the monetary aggregates. The confusion is such that
nobody knows just what money is nowadays, and past relationships are
obsolete.
The distinctions between one kind of deposit and others has become
more and more blurred. With all deposits insured by government agencies,
all seem equally secure. To make more and more of the total secure, the
maximum deposit insured has been lifted in stages to $100,000—an assump-
tion of a contingent liability th^t challenges the meaning of concepts
like risk and security in the field of monetary affairs.
Economists have long called for restraining the growth of the money
stock, but instead it accelerated. They spoke as if the Fed had the
necessary powers, but it could not even keep many banks under its juris-
diction. New legislation, after the damage was done, has been enacted.
The Depositary Institutions Deregulation Act (signed March 31, 1980)
tries to strengthen the Fed's control and also frees banking operations
for competition at higher interest rates. Thus Congress, like the
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regulators, has created opportunities and benefits for lenders, but
not for the people generally.
Banks and other financial corporations, like those in industry,
pursue the same basic goal of accumulation, and this leads to similar
outcomes of concentration and pricing behavior. Through holding
companies, they become conglomerates and through branches and con-
sortiums, multinationals, extending their sphere of operations and
control. They exercise a great deal of allocative direction of real
economic activity, but in the surge toward bigness they get into high
risk investments, such as real estate trusts or loans to third world
countries. The risks in some of the latter may not be revealed until
a crisis develops. The unregulated Eurocurrency markets have soared
to a total volume of $800 billion, of which about four—fifths is in
dollars. At this level, Eurobanking represents another market not
far from comparable in size with the U.S. market and is beyond the
reach of national controls. Nobody knows what reserves or other
guarantee of value underlies these loans. The market is very volatile
and constantly adds to the threat that speculative movements of inter-
national hot money may move to whipsaw any of the world's banking
system.
In the fluctuations of the economy, the demand for credit cannot
be effectively stabilized. So interest rates vary widely, especially
the short-term rates, because funds must be kept in earning assets,
but the principles of administered pricing still have application.
They operate mainly through a leadership phenomenon known as the prime
rate, supposedly the rate charged the best of the bank's customers.
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When the big banks confirm the rate set by the leaders most other banks
conform to the pattern.
Changes in the prime rate are publicized the day they occur, so
it represents a standard known to all, not unlike the old rule of
"Pittsburgh Plus" that used to be relied on in steel. On this basis,
Wall Street brokers charge their customers at rates up to 2 percentage
points above the prime for margin loans on securities. Small banks
outside the centers of finance also rely on this price indicator,
informing their customers of loan rates in such terms as, "We have
to charge the prime rate plus 3 percentage points for loans on re-
ceivables." In the instability of the 1970s, the prime took the lead
from the volatile rates on treasury bills and commercial paper on
the advances; then it was held high, lagging on the declines. Early
in 1980 the prime surged to an unprecedented peak of 20 percent, in
part because the authorities had given the word of approval and freed
the banks from any official reaction, any jawboning even, from a govern-
ment beguiled by claims of fighting inflation.
The banks take advantage of the official concern about inflation
despite being among the chief builders of the inflation. What they
are selling is credit, and the more credit they sell, the greater is
the spur to inflation. Because inflation produces such disagreeable
effects, people accept the high interest charges which are presumably
aimed at bringing it under control. Partial justification for the
rates is provided by the monetarist thesis that inflation should be
controlled by tight money and that interest rates should be left free
to go where the market takes them, without upper limit. Another kind
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of justification derives from the specious theory of the "real rate
of interest." This enables the lender to say of the highest interest
rates charged since the 18th century that in real terms he is not
making anything at all. It makes this claim possible by confusing
income with unrealized changes in the purchasing power of capital.
Whatever weight they may rut on these arguments, the main objective
of the authorities is to slow the economy.
For the banks, it is a great advantage in having their own prices
and incomes used by the authorities as a way of restraining the infla-
tion of others' prices and incomes. But banks do not want restriction
of their own volume of business, and their strong influence with the
authorities results in giving them high rates without real tightening
of money. Funds remained amply available to support whatever demand
for credit could be enticed even at the peak of the boom in 1979-80.
With a few incidental exceptions, that is the only kind of "tight
money policy" we have had in this country. It i s merely a "high
interest rate policy." Inflation and interest rates build on each
other and also build demands for credit, which then overbuilds the
boom and magnifies the volume of shaky debt that will have to be
liquidated after the downturn.
The new insituticnal factors in finance—the speculative fever
and the promotion of money substitutes
—
give new twists to the old
patterns but have two main effects, both undesirable. They amplify
V Lewis Bassie, "The Real Rate of Interest: A Thesis in
Pseudoscience," Quarterly Feview of Economics and Business , Winter,
1976, p. 7-18.
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the cycle by pushing the credit boom to an extreme, and they aggra-
vate the inequality of wealth by concentrating savings and the gains
from inflation in the hands of the speculators and owners of capital.
The financial aspects of the cycle are out of control.
As long as the funds created by credit expansion remain active,
being transferred from one user to another in real or speculative
transactions, the boom is stimulated. As the boom runs its course
they tend to pass into the hands of those willing to hold them in-
active, whether for lack of profitable opportunities or pessimistic
views of prospects. This happens when investment goals become satu-
rated; it first slows the advance, then breaks the boom. The loose
money looking for action begins to move into hoards, and after the
turn, liquidation of debt through repayment or bankruptcy becomes the
order of the day. The meaning of the cycle lies in the fact that there
is no stability in any of its phases, most certainly not in the specu-
lative blowing-up of the credit bubble at the peak of a stagnating
economy.
Partners in Instability
Most of the current economic difficulties originate in the private
sector, and the efforts to blame the government for them are inappropriate.
Nevrtheless, changes in the structure and functioning of the economy re-
quire rethinking of the methods for dealing with inflation and unemploy-
ment, for in recent years government and business have in effect become
partners in instability.
That something is wrong in the government is clearly perceived.
However, the trouble is not with the budget or with the bureaucracy
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as its doctrinare opponents believe. The failure of the government
to avoid inflationary policies and to restrain such policies being
pursued by producer and financial groups is political in nature. The
idea that developments can be explained without reference to the
political struggles that underlie them is an illusion still harbored
by economists in disregard of the facts.
Many politicians have seen that recent expenditures and deficits
have not been successful in providing the needed economic strength,
but few are willing objectively to trace the failure back to its causes
and take action to remove them. They are the policy makers, and the
policies they make are a patchwork of confusion; each satisfies some
group, but few satisfy a majority. Most believe they are in favor of
measures to strengthen the economy. Some hope to do this by turning
the clock back, by making industry competitive again, in complete
disregard of the way anti-trust cases against such corporations as
IBM, Kodak, and Kellogg remain bogged down for years in the courts.
Others hope to improve the situation by deregulation where regulation
already exists; these industries are often more favorable to continuing
regulation than they are to introducing competition, because the regu-
lation is frequently anti-competitive, and t.*ey reluctantly accept the
change feeling that other means of price administration will have to be
developed. In short, economic policy is like the federal deficit itself,
It has no independent existence but merely appears as the working out of
a myriad of specific policies in combination with new developments in
the economy.
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After any recession, the government properly maintains fiscal
and monetary stimuli for a while because business fixed investment
lags and does not make a strong recovery until industrial protection
has recovered all the way to the past peak. Presumably, government
should begin to cut back when that point is reached. However, high
unemployment may persist beyond that peak, especially if the measures
relied on are better designed to expand liquidity than to increase
the number of jobs available and the hoped-for stimuli are aborted.
Then deficits continue, money is generated and cumulates year by year,
and the cumulative total becomes a basis for inflation. This is not
the main "engine of inflation" because private debt expansion is much
greater, but it is not good that the government should be contributing
at all to overheating the economy in boom times.
Action on the revenue side is important in this, as already in-
dicated. In fact, tax cutting has become almost the sole means relied
on for stimulating the economy; it is appropriate only in the very
short run, when quick action is needed, and beyond that it is very in-
efficient and involves the greatest waste of government resources.
Plans for positive action which would directly deal with the unemploy-
ment and related problems in an extended recession are almost completely
lacking. Deficits without postive effect therefore appear; and the
enemies of government who are the main beneficiaries have aother com-
plaint to publicize.
A widely voiced opinion holds that federal deficits are different
because the Fed has to finance them through monetary expansion. Actually,
the Fed accommodates both Treasury and private credit demands in fostering
-34-
recovery and growth. If anything, it is more responsive to the demands
of the financial community than those of the government. This means
monetary expansion, which continues as the recovery progresses, and as
it cumulates to the point of excess liquidity, it spurs inflation.
Interest rates are then put up to restrain the advance, but they tend
for a while to be more inflationary than restraining: They immediately
boost costs of working capital; the announcement effects are positive
for business decisions; the expectation of higher capital costs in
the future creates a desire for increased cash flow immediately; and
all these can be made effective quickly in prices. Thus, the tax
cutting and monetary policies used in promoting the recovery remove
the limits on the upswing. Expansionary policies carried too far,
partly for political subservience rather than compelling economic
reasons, push the ceiling on monetary-spending activity to so high a
level that either a reversal must ensue or inflationary pressure will
mount to explosive force.
Only in the late stages of the boom when speculation becomes ram-
pant, does the Fed react strongly. In 1929 the concern was with the
soaring stock market. In 1979 with wider speculation the Fed again
became panicky enough to disregard the dangers of policy that would
break the boom.
With inflation accelerating and the outcry against it becoming
strident just a year before the election of 1980, the Administration
too found it intolerable to wait for the boom to run its course. It
net only backed the Fed's action but called for complete balancing
of the 1981 federal budget. The proposed cutting of expenditures
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added a little to the deflationary impact had already been achieved
by fiscal policy, and it will further depress the real cycle. The re-
sult is to aggravate the underutilization of capacity, so that capital
spending will join other key components on the decline. Making policy
changes a phase of cyclical behavior in this way coordinates the thrust
of both partners in the mixed economy toward maximizing the depth and
the duration of the recession of 1980.
After the downturn, fiscal and monetary policy will be reversed
but cnly too late. The negative forces released by the interaction
of real and financial cycles are then overriding. Rapidly mounting
federal deficits and antagonism to spending that has "failed" make
fiscal policy impotent, and monetary policy goes back to pushing on
the proverbial string. In other words, any move that turns the cycle
down changes many things in the private economy and cannot by its
reversal have an equally powerful effect in turning the economy back
up; the new positions reached will not be consistent with expansion
under the new "encouraging policies."
The basic real investment cycles, once turned down, tend to run
to extremes. As the Keynesian model showed, there is no floor for
fixed investment much above zero, so the higher the rate of output and
stockbuilding achieved in the boom, the greater the contraction that fol-
lows. In 1979 gross private investment rose to a rate of almost $400
billion and consumer durables to over $200 billion. The stockflow re-
lationships governing investment not only assure sharp declines but a
ii
long drawn-out period before growth can be resumed. ' Furthermore,
See V Lewis Bassie, Economic Forecasting , McGraw-Hill, 1958,
esp. Chapter 10.
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the transit syndrome will cut the underlying consumer demand which
provides the criterion for distinguishing between desired and excess
stocks. Thus, in a concerted decline, the potentials for depression
of investment in plant and equipment, housing, and inventories are
relatively much the same as those of the late 1920s.
Similarly, the credit cycle that has created the excessive money
supply and the huge overhang of debt is headed into a downturn. In
the credit cycle, expansion typically swings all the way over to liquida-
tion in a major decline, and in 1979 funds being raised by private bor-
rowers reached a rate of $350 billion. Liquidation on even a moderate
scale could hardly be orderly. Speculators who change course are never
willingly patient, and the public's attitudes have changed in ways that
make maintenance of the integrity of debt dubious. Foreigners, many of
whom have even less respect for the obligatory claims of debt, are being
put under unbearable pressure by oil and food prices, by soaring debt
service, and by efforts to strengthen the dollar. So in a deep recession,
the whole debt structure will fall apart. The chain reaction of financial
liabilities will produce a tidal wave of defaults and bankruptcies. The
dumping of assets repossessed or foreclosed will aggravate the transit
syndrome by reducing the volume of new production that can be sold at
fixed prices. The depth of ruin cannot be conceived by those who think
that future recessions can be no worse than 1974-75. In short, the
private economy pulls the stops on the downslide, and again the potentials
are not significantly less adverse than in 1929.
What this picture of partners in instability conveys is the fra-
gility of the mixed economy. The drive of market forces, the drive for
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capital accumulation, can no longer produce the equilibrium solutions
conceived by economic theory and sought by administrators everywhere.
As Albert Sommers puts it, "The outcomes produced by the free market,
and the outcomes foregone by the free market, do not necessarily add
up to a liveable, survivable world by modern standards, much less the
12best of all possible worlds. In turn, the government cannot live
up to its commitment for full employment. The policy instruments avail-
able to it are not big enough.
The Rejection of Planned Solutions
As typical developments revealed in past experience, both extreme
inflation and severe depression eventuate in breakdowns. When conditions
no longer promise prosperity government and business go separate ways.
Government must still try to minimize hardship and promote recovery, but
business is not accountable for its share of the decisions affecting the
state of the economy. Business must seek its own salvation in what it
regards as protective action. So instead of helping government achieve
an early stabilization, these self-seeking responses hamper government
efforts.
With the displacement of competition in market pricing, an alterna-
tive form of economic governance must be developed. The most obvious
source of such an alternative would seem to be some form of government-
13led planning. Properly considered, planning is a method of problem
"Ends and Means in the 1980s," Across the Board , Sept. 1979, The
Conference Board, NY, p. 23.
13Gunnar Myrdahl, Beyond the Welfare State .
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solving that anticipates developments, sets goals in the light of those
developments, puts resources to work, for reaching those goals, and uti-
lizes controls to ensure that operations are carried through as effi-
ciently as possible. Note that planning and controls are coordinate
terms: without controls, planning is futile, little more than a descrip-
tion of one course rather than another; without planning, control is
tyranical and meaningless, a source of endless controversy.
Neither the planning nor the controls need to be dictatorial
and inflexible. In fact, in a situation where extremes of discomfort
are reached, planning may be the best way of avoiding authoritarianism;
for if plans cannot be carried out cooperatively and effectively, dic-
tation may be forced, with an end to capitalism or democracy, or both.
But it cannot be carried out that way if politicians and businessmen
insist on maintaining the existing shares of power and influence in
the economic sphere.
Many businessmen utilize planning in their own operations, as
part of the means to their success. But they thoroughly oppose it on
a broader scale, as if the success of the general economy was not rele-
vant to their own. The kind of planning they do for themselves has
neither the focus nor the absence of destabilizing effects that would
make it suitable for dealing with overall economic problems. Yet they
insist on an ideology of laissez-faire, a refusal to give up any sover-
eignty. Costly regulations have been forced upon them, and they properly
complain when the regulation is excessive and inconsistent; what they may
not see is that it has these undesirable characteristics because it
was passed piecemeal, without being considered in the light of all its
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effects. So they resist in a way that is more likely to bring on what
they fear than to give them the relief they want. In totality, their
complaints, some valid, some merely self-seeking, become part of the
confrontation that prevents cooperative solutions.
In the U.S., we have some planning in government also. Budget
making is a form of planning for federal expenditures and revenues
in the year ahead. It shows greater rationality and promise since
the implementation of the Budget Control Act of 1974. However, the
budgetary process needs to look further into the future and to be
broadened to other kinds of economic and social problems. Better
coordination of fiscal and monetry policy is also desirable.
Hardly anything can be done right in legislation or regulation
without planning. Hardly anything can be done right in stabilizing
the economy without controls. Many things cannot be done at all un-
less done by government; there is simply no way the market could
pay entrepreneurs to undertake them. The Europeans are far ahead of
us in recognizing these facts and are far more willing to face them
without quibbling about words. In this country, the structure of our
political institutions, and the processes of selecting candidates for
election to key posts, seem designed to prevent the more fundamental
solutions from even being talked about.
Many proposals for making the government and the economy work
as they should have been and are being made. Common Cause states that
it "is fighting to change our government without destroying it . . .
before it destroys itself," and to that end proposes numerous "radical
—
but reasoned—changes." In her recent book, Barbara Ward points to ways
-40-
for solving a multitude of currently critical problems, problems en-
countered by advanced and developing nations, by cities, and by people
14in their social and material environments. Bringing them all to-
gether in a single volume averts most of the conflicts and partial view-
points appearing in the specialized works of others. However, the very
myriad of good ideas, not just in her book but in similar proposals,
results in less acceptance than their authors deserve. The confusions
and cacophonies produced as each proposal is criticized, often by well-
heeled manipulators of the public attention, reduce them to whispers in
the arena of legislative action.
Thus, the need for essential controls is ignored. More than a
generation ago it was recognized that stabilization cannot be effective
without some control of real investment. If everybody is free to do
anything when he wants to do it, and to do nothing at other times, the
concert of opinion will produce large fluctuations. Nobody has wanted
to tackle this complex problem. Nobody really could do anything about
it in the absence of knowing how increasing or lowering investment would
fit with other variables, of deciding how the timing of acceleration or
braking could be arranged in a phase of the business cycle where it
could be both effective and tolerable. Nobody ever will unless it is
seen as part of the moving pattern of economic development as a whole,
that is, in its role as a basic element in a general plan.
More current in the realm of controls is the sorry record on money
and credit. Eccnomists have complained for years about the failure to
14
Progress for a Small Planet , Norton, 1979.
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restrict the money stock, and their valid pleading on this point long
went unheeded. However, as the recent experience shows, were money
to be made really tight while interest rates were free to rise without
limits, the potential for transfers from borrowers, the active agents
of economic expanision, to lenders, the passive profiters from money
holdings, would soar beyond any reasonable justification. Both monetary
expansion and interest rates should be matched to the requirements of
a general plan.
Most important of all in the present situation are price and wage
controls, since the private controls already in place are not likely to
be acceptable in the long run. Leaving prices free not only oppresses
the weak and poor, it destabilizes the economy, diverts investment into
nonproductive channels, drains the force from government efforts to pro-
mote prosperit3»-, allows taxes to be passed on to consumers, and creates
a power base for the domination of political action. Yet the cost of
control is said to be too high.
Denial of this is not to say that prices have to be held entirely
stable. Various degrees of flexibility are possible, but if controls
are to work, they must be mandatory and they must be applied with deter-
mination. In 1972, the last period when controls applied, there was
largely voluntary cooperation through the election year. Then, com-
pliance was made voluntary by President Nixon, much to the confusion
and embarrassment of his controllers, and the ineffective operation cf
the program led them to say that control is impossible. In contrast,
people do not accept that conclusion. The large majority favors controls,
and even the unions favor randatory controls over ".guidelines" that
are effective mainly in restraining wage increases.
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The controversy cannot be resolved in its own terms. Price controls
by themselves would suffer unalterable opposition and many difficulties in
setting standards and in enforcement. A strong case can be made that they
could only be made workable as part of a more general system of planning.
Note that that was the situation during World War II.
Economists argue against controls mainly from their preoccupation
with outdated notions about the allocative functions of free market
prices, which are supposed to direct resources into their best uses.
Instead, obstacles to efficient allocation by the present day market
are insuperable. The system of competitive pricing—however nostalgi-
cally we look upon it—has been replaced by an inefficient system of
pricing governed by the private politics of non-price competition and
the hunger for wealth. Pricing focussed on accumulation in a financial
sense, on controlling prices high and output low, reduces the need for
capacity and so lowers investment and the accumulation of real capital
needed for increasing productivity. Even when monopolistic pricing
applies only partially, the theoretical solutions break down, as was
shown in the theory of "the second best." Prominant economists like
J. R. Hicks and Joan Robinson have concluded that competitive equilibrium
theory no longer retains whatever validity it once had.
The oil industry has been very revealing. Its part in the infla-
tion is brushed off as the result of a foreign conspiracy. But note
that the big oil companies are not ours; they are not national but
supernational organizations and deal with governments everywhere on
the basis of their own powers of negotiation. Note also how eager
domestic producers have been to grab all the benefits of OPEC's
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"artificial pricing," how quickly they spread the inflation to alterna-
tive sources of energy, how they lobbied for decontrol, how they created
dummy transactors, how they welcomed the opportunity to share the benefits
of conspiracy in the name of freedom. The principles underlying this
behavior are not confined to the oil industry. Control would indeed
interfere with allocating them into the hands of the inflators.
So the public interest demands price controls as well as planned
direction. But prices cannot be controlled in a system where the bene-
ficiaries of setting them as high as they want have the upper hand.
Controls over prices exist—through mutual understandings, through con-
glomerate mergers, through multi-national extensions, and through
batteries of legal talent that are expensive but pay for themselves
many times over while delaying and preventing adverse court decisions.
The right to set prices is the corporations' crucial entitlement. They
will stonewall to keep it. And they now have enough influence over the
politicians and the agencies to secure the status quo.
So inflation will persist, with some moderation from sacrifice
sales and dumping of excess stocks, until the mechanisms of price
administration break down. That happened at the lows of the depression
in 1932-33. Now the mechanisms are much stronger. They would break
only at such an intolerably low level that the whole structure of the
politico-economic system would be shaken. The fate of the nation is
written in the shibboleths of "free private enterprise."
No doubt there is good reason to fear authoritarianism. That it
can reach dreadful extremes is amply demonstrated in the history of the
last half century. What may be the biggest current mistake is thinking
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it can be avoided by setting up a confrontation of ideologies that
will be resolved by public-relations methods involving control of
the mass media. Ultimately, the issue must be resolved in the facts
of progress, welfare, and equity. A decade of stagflation is already
calling in question claims of the superiority of the existing "mixed"
system. Systematic rejection of all the means to new solutions is
nevertheless the order of the day. Proposed changes that could help
solve emerging problems without serious disruption but with some
departure from tradition are rejected as consistently, but with more
vigor and excitement, than before. This amounts to staking every-
thing on success in turning the overall economic trend upward quickly.
As Irving Kristol points out, it is " . . . only so long as economic
growth remains a credible reality that democracy will remain an
actuality."15
At the heart of the mixed economy's fatal illness is the instabil-
ity of the economy. A series of recessions growing in amplitude and
merging into the depression of the 1980s will boost unemployment into
double-digit figures, perhaps multiply it two or three times, and produce
violent reactions. Inflation and recession will then be mutually sup-
porting, and this combination represents the extremity of hard times
for the people.
Currently the prospect is not like 1933, which was a crisis of
deflation, not slumpflation, and the people's faith in the powers
and good intentions of the government never faltered. The chaos of
Wall Street Journal, November 26, 1979, p. 24.
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depression with inflation will surely tear up democracy as we have
known it. As the result of the one-two punch of inflation followed
by depression Hitler came to power in Germany. One of the important
lessons of Nazi Germany is that the shifting of powers may downgrade
any of the pre-existing classes. Unless transfers of control in this
country can be designed rationally, they will produce haphazard and
indeterminate results. For such changes to have a rational design,
the objectives of the corporate sector would have to change; power
that is not accountable will not be acceptable in the long run. That
such a change is possible, and that it could be enforced even if seen
and agreed to by corporate leaders is doubtful. On the political side,
the prospects for any significant move toward a solution look dim; the
American party system as now constituted is incapable of developing new
alternatives.
Distrust of the government is now on a par with distrust of big
business. In the mixed economy, the two temporarily combined to form
an establishment relied upon for prosperity, social order, and equity,
and both are being charged with responsiblity for its failures. Up
to this point, the people's cynicism and anger have focused more
directly on government, which is presumably committed to their welfare,
and frustration so far leads mainly to negative voting and non-voting.
The people know they do not control and feel cannot displace, the
corporation executives, but they are not unaware that money and media
politics interfere with adjustments in their favor. So increasingly
their anger finds a strong focus on industry, too.
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The exact nature of possible outcomes cannot be defined. One
possibility is that the drift toward dominance by the corporate elite
will continue and even be accelerated in adversity by the politicians'
desire to "restore business confidence." Then, government programs
and policies, basically subservient to the dictates of the potent
minority, would put greater emphasis on progress for business, and
the supporting political party greater emphasis on law and order.
As an alternative, the combination of economic instability and public
frustration might at some point produce a new political party and a
government basically detached from the corporate sector as now con-
stituted. In that case a basic reformation of the corporation laws
would probably be undertaken to make top corporate personnel account-
able and removable as well as to make corporations more explicitly
public institutions with a share of responsibility for the public
interest in both good times and bad. In either case, the change
would be presented as a response to popular demands, and the semblance
of democratic forms would be preserved, however much they might be
subordinated to authoritarian leadership. In either case, also,
the mixed economy would be dead.
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